Power Struggle for Intelligence Control in Mexico

All of this occurs in a climate where security has become the absolute priority, and every piece of information is as valuable as a troop deployment. The final picture, then, shows an administration traversed by a silent but decisive struggle. The tension became exposed even when the Secretary of Security himself came out to publicly deny differences with Trevilla, a gesture that, far from closing the debate, confirmed that the internal noise had already escalated too much. At the heart of Mexican power, a less and less disguised showdown is developing between the civilian wing of security and the military structure that has accumulated decisive weight in the conduct of the State in recent years. That is why the fight is not exhausted in organizational charts: it is about knowing who drives the information that anticipates threats, guides operations, and produces a political advantage within the government itself. The recent situation aggravated this tension. At the same time, cooperation with U.S. agencies and commands intensified in sensitive operations, and the Mexican Senate recently even authorized the temporary entry of U.S. military personnel for training tasks linked to the security of the 2026 World Cup. In February 2026, the government modified the agreement of the School of Intelligence for National Security, another sign that the redesign did not remain frozen on paper and continues to advance in the training and professionalization of the system. In this scenario, the figure of Omar García Harfuch, head of the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection, has grown steadily under the direct support of President Claudia Sheinbaum, while the military apparatus headed by General Ricardo Trevilla Trejo seeks not to cede strategic spaces. The turning point was the reform pushed by the ruling party to reorganize the security and intelligence system in Mexico. When governments start fighting over who administers intelligence, the conflict ceases to be technical: it becomes political, strategic, and often personal. There is, for now at least, no public evidence to speak of a consummated institutional rupture, but there are concrete signs of a harsh dispute for command of intelligence, criminal investigation, and the administration of sensitive information. During the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the Armed Forces expanded their role far beyond public security and began to manage public works, infrastructure, and sensitive areas of the State. This dual reading is not minor: while the civilian secretary capitalizes politically on the advances, the military establishment seeks to make it clear that it remains irreplaceable on the ground. The most strident version, that of a consummated fracture with dismantling and irreconcilable cross-accusations, is not supported by sufficient public evidence. This forced coexistence, useful on the surface, does not eliminate the underground competition for real control of the security apparatus. At the same time, institutional reconfiguration continued. The hardening of the security strategy, the offensive against the cartels, and the constant pressure from the United States to demand results pushed Sheinbaum to show effectiveness and command. The arrival of Sheinbaum with a strategy more focused on intelligence, investigation, and civil coordination altered that balance. But what is at stake cannot be minimized either. In other words, the project was not merely a bureaucratic adjustment: it implied redrawing who watches, who processes, who crosses data, and, above all, who decides. This shift in power set off alarms in the military world. In practice, the clash did not seem to respond to a personal fight, but to something deeper: the difficulty for military power to accept that the center of gravity of security returned, even partially, to civilian hands. The background of this fight is delicate. The death of El Mencho, leader of the CJNG, reinforced the profile of García Harfuch as the visible face of the new hard line, although the Mexican government itself emphasized the role of the Secretariat of National Defense in that operation. This operational concentration made control of the data the true safe of power. What is verifiable is that Mexico redefined by law its intelligence system, empowered the civilian wing of security, forced information sharing to previously more jealous organisms, and opened a dispute over jurisdiction, influence, and command within the State itself. The new legal architecture also enabled a central intelligence platform with access and interconnection over administrative records, documentary databases, and relevant public systems. The new Law of the National System of Investigation and Intelligence in Public Security Matters, published in July 2025, placed the SSPC as coordinator of the national system, confirmed the National Intelligence Center as the central piece of the scheme, and ordered the permanent interconnection of databases and intelligence systems of key organisms, including the National Guard, the Secretariat of the Navy, the Attorney General's Office, and state institutions. Journalistic versions published during 2025 reported on resistances from the Army to the laws that strengthened García Harfuch, particularly in the field of investigation and intelligence, historically dominated by military areas. And in Mexico, this battle is already underway. Mexico City - March 30, 2026 - Total News Agency - TNA -.